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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should the jury's factual determination as to whether 
plaintiffs have suffered a compensable "taking" by way of an 
unreasonable interference, impairment or restriction of their 
right of reasonable access or loss of parking be reversed on 
appeal where the evidence shows at most conflicting testimony and 
reasonable minds might differ as to the outcome? 
2. Should the jury's calculation as to the amount of 
severance damages be reversed on appeal merely because reasonable 
minds might differ as to the weight to be given to such evidence 
when the calculation was based on proper instructions from the 
trial court and was supported by competent evidence admitted 
without objection? 
REFERENCE TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals upon which this 
petition for writ of certiorari is based is The Carpet Barn v. 
State of Utah, 127 Utah Adv. Rpts. 15 (January 24, 1990) which is 
attached as part of the Appendix at Exhibit "A." 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision in this 
matter on January 24, 1990. The parties stipulated to grant 
petitioner/respondent state of Utah an extension of time to and 
including March 20, 1990, within which to file its Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari in this matter and an order to that effect was 
signed by Justice Richard C. Howe on March 9, 1990, Jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal in the above-entitled action is conferred upon 
the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) 
(1988) and pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
There are no provisions of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code 
Annotated or other regulations that are specifically determina-
tive of the issues presented in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an inverse condemnation action brought by plaintiffs 
to recover for the fair market value of property taken by the 
inadvertent construction of underground footings and a retaining 
wall onto plaintiffs1 property by contractors for the state of 
Utah in conjunction with the expansion and widening of the 
travelled portion of Redwood Road as it abuts and borders upon 
plaintiffs1 property. Plaintiffs seek damages including the fair 
market value of the property actually taken together with a 
temporary construction easement and severance damages, if any, to 
the remaining land resulting from that minimal physical 
encroachment or "taking." By stipulation of the parties, the 
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date of the "taking" was established as of August 27, 1985, for 
purposes of valuation and assessment of just compensation. The 
case proceeded to trial on the sole remaining issues of the fair 
market value of the property taken and severance damages, if any, 
caused to the remainder of plaintiffs1 property by the taking. A 
jury trial was held on September 28, 29 and 30, 1987 in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Frank G. Noel presiding. At the conclusion of the evidence, the 
jury returned its special verdict awarding plaintiffs total 
damages in the amount of $5,410.00 which consisted of $289.00 as 
fair market value for the property actually taken by construction 
of the underground footings and retaining wall onto plaintiffs1 
property, $578.00 for a temporary construction easement and 
$4,583.00 for severance damage to the remaining property as 
reflected in the Judgment On Special Verdict dated October 27, 
1987, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B to the Appendix. 
Following denial of motions for additur or, in the 
alternative, new trial, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to 
this Court. The case was then referred to the Court of Appeals 
and proceeded to oral argument on October 16, 1989 and the 
decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on January 24, 1990, 
reversing the trial court on two grounds and remanding for 
further proceedings. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs have owned the property in question since 
approximately 1971 and became aware shortly after that time of 
the possibility that it might be necessary for the State of Utah 
to utilize its entire right-of-way in order to widen the traveled 
portion of Redwood Road (Tr. 4, 45). 
2. The three buildings which comprise the structures on 
the Carpet Barn property are located three (3) inches from the 
north property line and twenty (20) feet from the south property 
line. The property has a total frontage of approximately one 
hundred-ninety-two (192) feet. The buildings were constructed 
twenty (20) feet from the State's existing right-of-way and 
thirty-eight (38) feet from the traveled portion of the roadway 
prior to the highway expansion project in question (Tr. 42, 114, 
275). 
3. From the time of the acquisition of the property by 
plaintiffs until the construction of this roadway widening 
project, patrons of the Carpet Barn gratuitously used or borrowed 
the State's right-of-way, both for the purpose of maneuvering to 
obtain ingress and egress from the property and, on occasion, for 
parking (Tr. 44-45; 48). 
4. As part of the road widening project, the State 
constructed a retaining wall across much of the front of 
plaintiffs1 property along the right-of-way and after the 
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construction project was completed it was discovered that the 
footings and wall had encroached on plaintiffs1 property (Tr. 62-
63). 
5. Plaintiff Kenneth MacQueen crystallized the real issue 
in the case during his testimony as being the interference with 
access and loss of parking in front of the building, even if the 
project had been redesigned to eliminate the retaining wall and 
footings in question in a way so as to not intrude or encroach 
upon the plaintiffs1 property (Tr. 48-49). 
6. Customer parking at the Carpet Barn ranges from an 
average of four to six cars at any one time on a typical day to 
probably ten or eleven at any one time on a busy Saturday. After 
completion of the construction project, parallel parking is 
available in the State's right-of-way along the curb and gutter 
in front of the building which accommodates up to eight parking 
spaces and eleven or twelve stalls are available in the rear of 
the building for additional parking for customers (Tr. 51-52; 
133) . 
7. Expert testimony was presented both for plaintiffs and 
defendant as to the reasonableness of access, with experts for 
both parties taking different approaches to the problem while 
agreeing that access was not reasonable but disagreeing as to 
whether the action of the State in constructing the project in 
question was the cause of that problem (Tr. 103; 234-237). 
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8. The plaintiffs1 expert testified that access to the 
property was not reasonable after construction of the highway 
project (Tr. 103). 
9. The State's expert concluded that access was as 
reasonable after the project as it was before with no net gain or 
loss on the part of the property owner (Tr. 247). 
10. Expert appraisal testimony was presented both for 
plaintiffs and the State of Utah on the issue of damages or just 
compensation to be awarded by the jury. Both appraisers used 
essentially the same approach in determining values before and 
after the taking as part of the total damages to be awarded 
(Trial Exhibits 39 & 49, copies of which are attached as 
Exhibits C and D, respectively, to the Appendix). 
11. The State's appraiser testified as to value both before 
and after the construction of the project, concluding that the 
value was essentially the same except for the amount of the 
damages for the taking, which included $289.00 for the value of 
the property actually taken by construction and encroachment of 
the footings and retaining wall onto plaintiffs1 property, 
$578.00 for a temporary construction easement and $4,543.00 as an 
award of severance damages representing the difference in value 
of the remaining property before and after the taking based on 
the cost for landscaping the area in front of the building to 
correct any damage caused by construction of the project, which 
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testimony was received without objection (T. 292-295; 309-310; 
334). 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant-Respondent State of Utah respectfully submits that 
this court should grant its Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
because the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals, prior decisions of this Court and because the case 
presents an important question of law which ought to be settled 
by this Court. 
The issues presented here with respect to claims for loss of 
access, loss of parking and amount of severance damages were not 
disposed of prior to trial on motion, but thoroughly and 
vigorously litigated throughout the course of a three-day jury 
trial in which plaintiffs were able to fully present their theory 
of the case. The question of what constitutes reasonable access 
under the particular facts and circumstances that apply to a 
specific piece of property and the amount of severance damages to 
be awarded in the event of a partial taking are unique questions 
of fact suited for disposition in the trial court. That 
determination should not be disturbed merely because reasonable 
minds might differ as to the outcome or weight to be given the 
testimony presented on both sides of the issues. 
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POINT I 
SHOULD THE JURY'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFERED A COMPENSABLE "TAKING" BY WAY OF A 
DEPRIVATION OR SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE WITH THEIR RIGHT OF 
REASONABLE ACCESS OR LOSS OF PARKING BE REVERSED ON APPEAL 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS AT MOST CONFLICTING TESTIMONY 
AND REASONABLE MINDS MIGHT DIFFER AS TO THE OUTCOME? 
This Court has previously determined that where governmental 
action, even though not amounting to a physical taking of 
property, effectively deprives a property owner of reasonable 
access or otherwise substantially impairs a recognized private 
property right appurtenant to an owner's property and thereby 
causes peculiar injury, the owner is entitled to compensation. 
Hampton v. State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968); Utah 
State Road Commission v Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974); Three D 
Corp. v Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
By this Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the State of Utah 
does not ask this Court to re-examine that entire line of cases 
with respect to the basic legal principles enunciated. Rather, 
the State respectfully submits this Court should defer to the 
specific factual determination made by the jury at trial in this 
case based on competent evidence, properly admitted, and with 
more than adequate jury instructions which fully presented 
plaintiffs1 theory of the case. Under these circumstances, 
plaintiffs have had their day in court on the issues presented 
and the jury verdict should not be overturned. 
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The case-by-case nature of this factual inquiry has been 
explicitly recognized in the prior holdings of this Court and the 
Court of Appeals. In Hampton, supra, this Court reversed a 
dismissal of plaintiffs1 claims alleging a substantial and 
material impairment of access to their property and remanded to 
the trial court, citing as instructive the following language: 
Where that authority depends on the ascertainment of the 
fact of whether or not there is a 'taking1 the court may 
entertain the suit in order to determine what are the facts 
and, consequently, whether the authority existed * * * 
[Citation omitted]. 
This case is reversed and remanded for a factual 
determination of whether plaintiffs1 property has been 
"taken11 by a denial of their free and convenient access to 
their property. 
445 P.2d at 712. [Emphasis added]. 
The Court had earlier in its opinion cited with approval 
language characterizing the issue as follows: 
Further, many cases deal with the rights of an abutting 
owner upon a public street or highway and point out that 
such right constitutes a property right and is an interest 
in land which cannot be taken by condemnation without 
payment therefor. Nevertheless, the cases point out that 
this right is subject to well-recognized limitations and 
exclusions. One of these limitations is that the right of 
ingress and egress does not extend to every foot of the 
condemnees* frontage, but under the police power of the 
State the right may be limited to reasonable access under 
the existing facts and circumstances. [Citation omitted]. 
. . . Every citizen holds his property subject to the valid 
exercise of the police power. 
445 P.2d at 711. [Emphasis added]. 
In Miya, supra, this Court expanded that analysis to include 
substantial impairment of other recognized private property 
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rights appurtenant to land abutting on a public street. In that 
case, this Court refused to disturb the determination of the 
trial court with respect to the testimony of expert witnesses on 
relevant factors to be taken into account in an award of 
severance damages, which included impairment of light and air, 
view, privacy and deprivation of access. 526 P.2d at 929. 
In Three D Corp., supra, the Court of Appeals reversed a 
judgment in favor of Salt Lake City and remanded to the trial 
court for a factual determination as to whether the property 
owners were entitled to compensation based on substantial 
impairment of a right appurtenant to their property. The Court 
of Appeals specifically recognized the fact intensive nature of 
this determination and included an admonition which should apply 
with equal force and effect in the instant case, recognizing that 
trial courts "are in a much better position to evaluate an entire 
case, including its nuances and undisclosed pitfalls, then an 
appellate court." 752 P.2d at 1326 (citing Halladay v Cluff, 
739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The task of applying the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
Three D, supra, to the specific facts and circumstances presented 
here was complicated by the timing of the issuance of that 
decision. The jury trial in this case took place on September 
28-30, 1987. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Three D 
Corp. was issued on April 15, 1988. The submission of briefs in 
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this case took place thereafter, with the filing of appellants1 
brief in July of 1988, and all briefing was completed by the end 
of September 1988. However, the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
in Three D Corp. was not discussed by either party in their 
briefs, which addressed the issues as framed by appellants with 
respect to jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the 
proper measure of damages and exclusion of evidence. The case 
was cited as supplemental authority on the date of oral argument 
before the Court of Appeals on October 16, 1989 and discussed 
briefly in oral argument, but not adequately for the purpose of 
distinguishing the facts of this case. 
Two primary points of distinction should be noted between 
this case and Three D Corp., only one of which is addressed in 
the Court of Appeals1 written opinion. First, there was an 
actual physical "taking" here by virtue of the inadvertent 
encroachment during construction of the footings and retaining 
wall, whereas in Three D Corp. there was no actual physical 
taking based on the construction of a curb by Salt Lake City 
which did not encroach upon the plaintiffs1 property. However, 
the second major factual distinction between the two cases, which 
was overlooked by the Court of Appeals, is the fact that 
plaintiffs in this case were given the opportunity to make a full 
presentation of their theory of loss of access and loss of 
parking to the jury, but the weight of that testimony and the 
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determination as to whether a compensable injury had occurred 
should not be disturbed merely because the jury was not persuaded 
by plaintiffs1 evidence. 
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals agreed 
that nthe issue of reasonable access as it affects a 
determination of severance damages is dependent on the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case." 127 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 
(Citing State Road Commission v Christensen, 371 P.2d 552, 556 
(Utah 1962), emphasis added). 
Substantial evidence was presented by plaintiffs to the jury 
in this case regarding their claims of loss of reasonable access 
to the property and loss of parking. Both plaintiff Kenneth 
MacQueen and plaintiffs1 expert Jack DeMaas testified about the 
specific nature and degree of the interference and alleged 
unreasonableness of the loss of maneuverability and parking by 
virtue of the state's exercise of control over the entirety of 
its right of way in conjunction with the expansion of Redwood 
Road. Plaintiff Kenneth MacQueen crystallized the issue in his 
testimony by confirming that it was the loss of access and 
parking, regardless of the construction of the footings and 
retaining wall that created the problem from his perspective 
(Tr. 48-49). 
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Plaintiffs1 expert, Mr. DeMaas testified access was not 
reasonable as a result of construction of the highway widening 
project (Tr. 103). 
The jury was properly instructed as to the applicable legal 
principles, even considered in light of the later decision of the 
Court of Appeals in Three D Corp. Several instructions dealt 
specifically with the plaintiffs1 right of reasonable access and 
instructed the jury that an unreasonable interference with or 
impairment of that right was compensable as part of severance 
damages. (See jury instructions 18, 20, 21 and 22 attached as 
Exhibit E to the Appendix). 
In light of the totality of circumstances presented here, 
including the extensive testimony of plaintiffs and their experts 
and the instructions given to the jury, the persuasiveness and 
weight to be given that conflicting testimony is clearly within 
the province of the jury and should not be disturbed. 
POINT II 
SHOULD THE JURY'S CALCULATION AS TO THE AMOUNT OF SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES, BE REVERSED ON APPEAL MERELY BECAUSE REASONABLE 
MINDS MIGHT DIFFER AS TO THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO SUCH 
EVIDENCE WHEN THE CALCULATION WAS BASED ON PROPER INSTRUCTIONS 
FROM THE TRIAL COURT AND WAS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION? 
The trial court properly instructed the jury in this matter 
on the method to be used in calculating damages or just 
compensation and the measure of severance damages as being the 
difference between the value of the remaining property before and 
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after the taking. (See Jury Instructions 13, 14, 15, 16, and 
17, which are attached as Exhibit "F" to the Appendix). The 
damage or just compensation award ultimately returned by the jury 
included the nominal value of the minimal amount of land actually 
taken by encroachment of the footings and retaining wall, the 
value attributed to the construction easement and an amount 
representing severance damages to the remaining portion of the 
property of $4,543.00. The jury award was within the range of 
testimony of the experts. 
The jury instructions and testimony of the appraisers must 
be taken and applied as a whole, particularly given the unique 
nature of the questions presented here and the difficulty in 
separating and differentiating between plaintiffs1 claims with 
respect to loss of access and parking as opposed to other 
elements of damage or just compensation. 
Defendants1 appraiser testified that the value of the 
property, including land and buildings, prior to the date of 
taking was $306,000 based on a combination of market, cost and 
income approaches (Tr. 271-292). He further testified that the 
plaintiffs1 property had depreciated because of functional 
obsolescence which he explained to be problems inherent in the 
buildings as originally constructed for the purpose of 
manufacturing munitions (Tr. 278-282). 
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The buildings were constructed twenty (20) feet from the 
west boundary of the property (which is also the state's right-
of-way line) and thirty-eight (38) feet from the traveled way 
prior to the construction project. When the property was con-
verted from manufacturing to commercial use, the owner was faced 
with the problem of parking which was resolved at that time by, 
in effect, "borrowing" the use of the state's right-of-way in 
front of the building for maneuvering in order to obtain ingress 
and egress, as well as occasionally for parking (Tr. 44-45, 48). 
Cars parking directly in front of the building sometimes extended 
into the State's existing right-of-way. (See portion of Trial 
Exhibit 18, reproduced for demonstrative purposes and attached as 
Exhibit G to the Appendix). 
When it became necessary for the State to make full use of 
and exercise control over the entirety of its right-of-way for 
the best advantage of the public as traffic needs warranted, that 
inherent functional obsolescence became operational. The 
state's expert testified that the functional obsolescence was not 
caused by the "taking" but by the original change from 
manufacturing to commercial use (Tr. 292-293). 
Therefore, the actual value of the property was essentially 
the same before the taking as it was after the taking, with the 
exception of the elements of damage or just compensation 
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identified in his testimony, to include an award of $4,543.00 for 
severance damages (Tr. 309-310). 
The testimony of the state's appraiser with respect to the 
cost of landscaping the front of the building as representing the 
differential value before and after the taking was subject to 
thorough and vigorous exploration on cross-examination at trial. 
However, a complete review of the entire portion of the 
transcript dealing with his testimony demonstrates that it was 
based on before and after market values taking into consideration 
all relevant facts on which that was based, and a satisfactory 
explanation was provided on cross-examination as to how the 
witness arrived at his conclusions. 
The testimony of the State's appraiser, Mr. Lang, was inter-
rupted by a recess at the conclusion of one day of the trial and 
resumed the following day. As a result, it is necessary to read 
the entirety of his testimony in arriving at a determination as 
to whether it is relevant, admissible and sufficient to support 
the jury award. Mr. Lang began the discussion with respect to 
the various components and basis for his determination as to the 
values before and after the taking late one afternoon of the 
trial. The trial was recessed for the evening and his direct 
examination concluded the following day. That testimony included 
the method and manner for calculating the total damage award, 
consisting of the value of the property actually taken by 
-16-
construction of the footings and retaining wall, the value of a 
temporary construction easement and an award for severance 
damages based on the cost for landscaping the area in front of 
the building to correct any damage caused by construction of the 
project, for a total damage award or just compensation in the 
amount of $5,410.00. He testified that was the difference in the 
I 
value of the property before and after the taking (Tr. 309-310; 
Trial Exhibit 49 attached as Exhibit "D" to the Appendix). 
Merely because the differential in before and after values 
may be minimal should not obscure the basic soundness of that 
approach, which was appropriately and satisfactorily explained 
and defended under vigorous cross-examination. The degree to 
which it is persuasive is clearly a question of weight properly 
for the trier of fact and not an appropriate basis for a trial or 
appellate judge to substitute his or her judgment for that of the 
jury. 
Not to be overlooked in the context of this question is the 
realization that the plaintiffs1 expert appraiser offered 
extensive testimony reflecting his own opinions on the issue of 
the amount of $137,000.00 as severance damages which ought to be 
awarded and his conclusion, as reflected in Trial Exhibit 39 
which is attached as Exhibit C to the Appendix, advocated an 
award in that amount. As a result, the award of compensation for 
severance damages was within the estimate of values given by the 
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expert witnesses and therefore is supported by the evidence. 
Utah Department of Transportation v Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1033 
(Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Where, as here, a party has been given an opportunity to 
thoroughly litigate a claim at trial and receive the jury's 
decision thereon, an appellate court should not disturb the 
jury's conclusion merely on the basis that reasonable minds might 
differ as to the outcome. Quite to the contrary, the evidence 
should be viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed at trial in determining whether it is sufficient to 
support a verdict. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 
1988). 
For all the reasons set forth above, defendant-respondent 
State of Utah requests that this Court grant its Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari in order to review the important questions 
presented with respect to the factual determinations made by the 
jury at trial in this case on the questions of loss of access, 
parking and the amount of severance damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^^ day of March, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
^4*t& 
Jody K B\ 
Attorney^ /forDefendant-Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed first class, postage prepaid 
on this 20th day of March, 1990, to the following counsel of 
record: 
Clark W. Sessions 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
First Interstate Plaza - #400 
170 South Main Street 
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EXHIBIT A 
The Carpet Barn, a Utah 
corporation; Kenneth MacQueen 
and Harla MacQueen, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
OPINION 
v. 
State of Utah, by an,, through 
its Department of 
Transpc.tation, John Nye and 
John Do. 1 through X, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890315-CA 
F I L E D 
JAN 2 41990 
B'k Of fr # COLVt 
P Cou-'i <r. Appeals 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Clark W. Sessions and John F. Clark, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellants 
R. Paul Van Dam and Stephen C. Ward, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent, State of Utah 
Jody K. Burnett and Anne Swensen, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent, State of Utah 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellants, The Carpet Barn, Kenneth MacQueen, and Harla 
MacQueen, appeal from a final judgment in their favor for 
"inverse condemnation" and severance damages, and from denial 
of their motion for additur or, in the alternative, for a new 
trial. We reverse and remand. 
In 1971, the MacQueens purchased the subject property at 
3725 Redwood Road, in Salt Lake City. The MacQueens have 
operated a retail carpet and floor covering outlet, called "The 
Carpet Barn,M on the property since 1971. The property has 192 
feet of frontage on the west side of Redwood Road. The State 
maintained a right-of-way line on Redwood Road twenty feet from 
the front of the Carpet Barn building and thirty-eight feet 
from the traveled way. Since 1971, appellants and their 
customers have used the right-of-way to enter and exit the 
property. This allowed Carpet Barn's patrons to park in front 
of the building and maneuver into traffic without using the 
traveled asphalt portion of the then existing Redwood Road. 
Available parking spaces in front of the building numbered 
between fifteen and twenty. 
In 1984, the Utah Department of Transportation negotiated 
with appellants to acquire a strip of property along the 
frontage of their property for a highway widening project. 
Appellants refused the State's offer and the road widening 
plans were altered to proceed without acquiring appellants' 
property. The State constructed a retaining wall across the 
front of appellants' property along the right-of-way boundary. 
The wall ranged from sixteen inches to two feet high and was 
topped by a four-foot high chain link fence. The fence was 
removed prior to the time of trial. When the road project was 
completed it was discovered that footings constructed by the 
State encroached on appellants' property six inches. Access to 
appellants' property was limited by the retaining wall to a 
twenty-foot wide driveway which ran from Redwood Road to the 
rear of appellants' property. The State's minimum requirement 
for commercial driveways is twenty-five feet. The wall built 
by the State prevented parking in front of the building, 
eliminating the fifteen to twenty diagonal parking spaces. 
At trial, the jury was instructed that appellants' 
property had been taken. The jury awarded $289 for the fair 
market value of the property taken by construction of the 
footings on appellants' property and $578 for the fair market 
value of the temporary construction easement. The jury also 
awarded $4,543 in severance damages to the remaining property 
not taken by the State. Appellants filed a motion for additur 
or in the alternative for a new trial based on the jury's 
alleged misapplication of the proper formula in calculating 
severance damages. The court denied the motion. Appellants 
now appeal. 
On appeal, we address the following issues: (1) is the 
jury verdict for severance damages supported by sufficient 
evidence and was it properly calculated? (2) did the court err 
by admitting evidence of the cost to landscape? (3) did the 
court err by excluding appellants' evidence concerning the 
chain link fence and access to other properties? and (4) did 
the court err by failing to give appellants' requested jury 
instructions? 
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INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
On appeal, when a trial court's denial of a motion for a 
new trial is challenged on the basis that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict, "we reverse only 
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party who prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict." Hansen v. $tpw?rfr- 761 
P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988)• Generally speaking, a jury award for 
compensation in an eminent domain case is supported by 
competent evidence "if the award of compensation was within the 
estimate of alue given by one of the expert witnesses." Utah 
Dep't of Trar;p. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Utah 1984). A 
similar standard applies in a jury award for severance 
damages. 
Severance damages have been defined as "those caused by 
the taking of a portion of the parcel of property where the 
taking or the construction of the improvement on that part 
causes injury to that portion of the parcel not taken." Utah 
Dep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987) 
(emphasis in original). The trial court properly instructed 
the jury that the measure of severance damages is the 
difference between the value of the remaining property prior to 
the taking and the value of the remaining property after the 
taking. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Ravco Corp.. 599 P.2d 
481, 489-90 (Utah 1979). See also Herring v. Platte River 
Power Auth., 728 P.2d 709, 711 (Colo. 1986). The right of 
access is an easement appurtenant to land of an abutting owner 
on a street, and constitutes a property right which may not be 
taken without just compensation. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. 
Miva, 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974). Also, a jury award for 
condemnation compensation is not supported by the evidence 
where based on inadmissible evidence. Jones, 694 P.2d at 1033. 
In this case, Appellants' expert witness testified that 
the value of the property prior to the taking was $225,684; 
that the State's action changed the highest and best use of the 
property from commerical to light industrial; and that, as a 
result, the value of the property after the taking was 
$88,905. Had the jury adopted appellants' calculations, 
severance damages would be the difference — $137,778. 
The State's appraiser testified that the value of the 
property prior to the taking was $306,000. He did not estimate 
the value of the property after the taking; instead, he 
testified that the property had depreciated because of 
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functional obsolescence, which he explained to be problems 
inherent in the building as originally constructed. The 
State's expert testified that when appellants converted the 
property from manufacturing use to commercial use after their 
1971 purchase, they resolved their parking needs by using the 
State's right-of-way for parking. As a result, the State did 
not create the problem, but when it elected to utilize its 
existing right-of-way, the functional obsolescence, which had 
lain dorment since 1971, became operational. Therefore, 
according to the State's expert, the actual value of the 
property was the same before the taking as it was after the 
taking. He opined further that although the State's action 
impaired appellants' long established practice of utilizing 
their property for store-front parking, the State was not the 
legal cause of appellants' injury. The State's expert 
testified that appellants could provide substitute parking by 
tearing down a structure and converting the space to parking at 
a cost of $25,000, and erecting a replacement structure for 
$98,000. In addition, he testified, over objection, that it 
would cost $4,543 to properly landscape in front of the 
building, next to the wall erected by the State. 
The jury awarded $4,543 for severance damages, the exact 
amount that the State testified was needed to landscape the 
front of the building. Appellants contend that the $4,543 
figure adopted by the jury was improper as it is not the 
difference in value of the property before and after the 
taking, but only the cost for curing the front yard 
appearance. The State counters that testimony regarding 
landscaping had nothing to do with curing the parking problem 
but was offered as a means of increasing the value of the 
unusable parking strip. Consequently, argues the State, by 
awarding the cost of landscaping as severance damages, 
appellants were in the same financial position both before and 
after the taking, in terms of the property they were legally 
entitled to use. 
The State's argument that it was not the legal cause of 
diminution of market value of appellants' property runs counter 
to Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1326 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). The facts in Three D Corp. are similar to the 
case at hand. Salt Lake City, after unsuccessfully attempting 
to purchase a portion of appellants' property, extended the 
street surface to the existing legal boundary and constructed a 
solid curb along nearly the entire length of appellants' 
property, where before there had been continuous and accessible 
frontage along the street. As a result, appellants were 
deprived of most of their former parking spaces. This court 
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held that there is a right to compensation where the State's 
action, although not directly constituting a physical taking, 
"substantially impaired appellants' long-standing right to 
utilize their property for store-front parking and has caused 
them direct, peculiar injury" and consequent devaluation of 
their commercial property, I£. Three D Corp. noted that if 
the city had condemned part of appellants' property to 
construct a sidewalk, it would clearly have been required to 
compensate the owners for the decrease in value "attributable 
to the lost parking spaces." Id. at 1323 n.l. Similarly, in 
this case, the State's construction of the wall extending along 
the legal right-of-way line deprived appellants of their 
long-standing right to utilize part of their property for 
store-front parking, thus entitling them to compensation for 
any decrease in value caused by the loss of parking spaces. 
The State argues that Three D Corp. is inapplicable to 
this case because there was an actual taking here, albeit an 
inadverdent one because of the six-inch error in placement of 
the footings. By contrast, in Three D Corp., there was no 
actual taking because the curb constructed by Salt Lake City 
did not encroach on Three D's property. While this factual 
distinction exists, the State's argument is misguided. If 
compensation for lost parking spaces was appropriate in Three 
D. Corp. even absent a physical taking, surely it is 
appropriate in this case, where it is undisputed that a 
physical taking occurred. 
Appellants are entitled to severance damages calculated 
as the difference in value of the property before and after 
severance, to include consideration of the lost parking spaces, 
as well as any decrease in market value because of limited 
access. The jury was instructed, without objection, that the 
differential in market value was the appropriate formula.1 
The jury's award of $4,543, however, is the cost to landscape 
the front of the building, irrelevant to the proper formula for 
determining damages, and not competent evidence of market 
value. Moreover, it does not fall within the range of 
1. Because there was no objection to the court's instruction 
on the method of calculating severance damages, we need not 
determine whether this is the only permissible damage formula. 
See, however, the concurring opinion of Justice Hall and 
dissenting opinions of Justices Stewart and Crockett in Utah 
Dep't of Transp. v. Ravco Corp., 599 P.2d 481, 493-96 (Utah 
1979) . 
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estimates of either expert. Therefore, the jury's award is not 
supported by the evidence.2 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Appellants next claim the court erred in excluding 
evidence of the chain link fence erected by the State and of 
access allowed other comparable properties. In reviewing 
questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, we give 
deference to the trial court and will not overturn its ruling 
absent an abuse of discretion. Whitehead v. American Motors 
Sales Corp., 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (1989). 
Appellants argue that exclusion of the chain link fence 
evidence denies them the benefit of having the jury consider 
their fullest measure of damages. The chain link fence was a 
temporary obstruction, however, which was removed prior to the 
time of trial. Moreover, the fence had no effect on the loss 
of parking spaces. We conclude that the trial court correctly 
determined that evidence of the fence was irrelevant in 
calculating severance damages. 
Appellants also claim that they were prejudiced by the 
exclusion of evidence of access allowed to other comparable 
properties since a major element of their severance damages was 
that the limitation of access and loss of parking spaces 
necessarily changed the highest and best use of the property 
from commercial to light industrial. We agree with the State 
that the issue of reasonable access as it affects a 
determination of severance damages is dependent on the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case. See State Rd. 
Comm'n v. Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P.2d 552, 556 (1962) 
(proximity and severance damages paid to a neighboring property 
owner, absent a showing of complete similarity, are dependent 
on the facts and circumstances of each case); see also State 
Rd. Comm'n v. Taqqart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 167, 170 
(1967). Because appellants failed to demonstrate complete 
similarity between the other properties and their own 
circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to allow evidence of access afforded other properties, 
especially since such evidence would have little bearing on the 
2. It follows that the State's expert's testimony about 
landscaping costs, objected to by appellants, was erroneously 
admitted. In the posture of this case, such testimony was 
irrelevant to a calculation of the difference in market value 
before and after the severance. 
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question of the diminished value of this property as a result 
of the severance. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Because an appeal challenging the refusal to give jury 
instructions presents questions of law only, we grant no 
particular deference to the trial court's rulings. Ramon v. 
Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). 
A party is entitled to have his theories 
of the case submitted to the jury provided 
there is competent evidence to support 
them. Failure to give requested 
instructions is reversible error if it 
tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice 
of the complaining party or erroneously 
advises on the law. 
Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(citations omitted). 
Appellants first object to the trial court's failure to 
give proffered Instruction No. 26, which states: "You are 
instructed that the evidence in this case is that the State of 
Utah did not attempt, in any way, to restrict highway access of 
the Carpet Barn property until August, 1985." Appellants 
sought by Instruction No. 26 to give the jury a starting point 
to calculate severance damages. Instruction No. 16, however, 
which was given to the jury, states that the fair market value 
of the property "will be determined as of the 27th day of 
August, 1985,- and provides the jury the appropriate date from 
which to calculate damages. Further, whether the State ever 
attempted to utilize its right-of-way prior to the date of the 
actual taking is irrelevant to the calculation of severance 
damages. 
Appellants also object to the elimination of language 
from their proffered Instructions No's. 25 and 28. The 
language eliminated was to the effect that rights of ingress 
and egress and rights to access, light, and air could be 
"established by long-term use or travel." We find that a 
reading of these two instructions, absent the language 
eliminated still adequately reflects appellants' theory. We 
conclude that any error in refusing to include this language in 
the proferred instructions was harmless. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
61. 
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REVERSE AND REMAND 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an appellate court 
may order an additur, or in the alternative, a new trial in 
appropriate circumstances. Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 
686 (Utah 1981); Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826, 
828 (1958). We are unwilling to order an additur in this 
matter, as urged by appellants, because the evidence indicates 
a possible broad variance in appropriate severance damages. We 
recognize, further, that trial courts are in a much better 
position to evaluate all the nuances of a case than is an 
appellate court. See Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1326; Halladay 
v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643, 645 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). We, 
therefore, reverse and remand this case for a new trial or such 
other proceedings as might be appropriate in accordance with 
the views expressed in this opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE CARPET BARN, a Utah 
corporation; et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
C^ .vil No. C86-1963 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for jury trial before the above-
entitled court, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, on 
September 28-30, 1987. Plaintiffs were represented by Clark W. 
Sessions and John F. Clark of the firm of Sessions & Moore. 
Defendants were represented by Jody K Burnett and Anne Swenson of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, as well as Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen C. Ward. 
EXHIBIT "B 
A jury of eight persons was regularly impaneled and sworn to 
try said action. Plaintiffs and defendants introduced evidence 
through the testimony of witnesses and introduction of exhibits. 
After hearing the evidence, the instructions of the court, and 
the argument of counsel, the matter was submitted to the jury for 
consideration of their verdict. The jury having duly deliberated, 
returned a special verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against 
the defendants as follows: 
1. The fair market value of the property taken by 
construction of underground footings and a 
retaining wall onto plaintiffs' property: $ 289.00 
2. The fair market value of the temporary 
construction easement: $ 578.00 
3. Severance damages, if any, to remaining land: $ 4,543.00 
Total damages to plaintiffs $ 5,410.00 
In accordance with Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and based upon the Special Verdict returned by the jury 
in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants, and good 
cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be and the same 
is hereby entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants 
in the amount of Five Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars, ($5,410.00) 
together with interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum, 
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from and after the 27th day of August, 1985, until the date of 
judgment, and then interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) 
per annum thereafter until paid. f 
DATED this yl day of £L 1987. 
BY THE COURjT: 
Frank^G. Noel 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
"CTark W. Sessions^4^-^ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
ATTEST 
H. DIXCN HiMDI.EY 
Clerk 
By hi 4QK. r Deputy Cteitt 
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herein; that she served the attached Judgment on Special Verdict 
in Case Number C-86-1963 , in Third Judicial District 
Court, upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Clark W. Sessions 
Sessions & Moore 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 6th day of October Q , , 198J7_- ^  
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0 C t O b e r
 198 
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My Commission Expires: Notary Public 
Resident of the State of Utah 
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EXHIBIT "Fl" 
EXHIBIT E 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lak« Countv. I itah 
SEP 3 0 1987 
B y J J I -
' — T 0»putyCler* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE CARPET BARN, a Utah 
corporat ion, KENNETH MACQUEEN 
and HARLA MACQUEEN, 
Plaintiffs 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through i t s 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
JOHN NYE and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH X, 
Defendants 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: 
(See Ins truc t ions No. 1 to No. ) . 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CI\|lL NO. C-86-1963 
FYWTRTT liei, 
INSTRUCTION NO._Jj?_ 
You are instructed that the law recognizes that a landowner 
whose property fronts on a public highway has a right of 
reasonable access to the highway. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ w 
The State has authority to adopt and enforce regulations 
governing the use of and access to public highway rights of way, 
including regulations governing the location, number and width of 
driveways providing access to and from adjoining land. However, 
the State is prohibited by law from exercising this authority in 
a way that unreasonably interferes with or impairs an established 
right of ingress and egress to property adjoining a public 
highway. /J$ fJ&Cl£& 
Where an owner of adjoining land has rights of ingress and 
egress to a public highway and those rights are unreasonably 
impaired by the adoption of State regulations or the enforcement 
of those regulations, that owner is entitled to just compensation 
by way of severance damages for the unreasonable restriction of 
his right of access. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The rights of access, light, and air are easements 
appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they 
constitute property rights forming part of the owner's estate. 
These substantial property rights, although subject to reasonable 
regulation, may not be taken away or unreasonably impaired by the 
State without the payment of just compensation. 
Where, in connection with an actual taking of an abutting 
property owner's property, the erection of a permanent structure 
as a part of a public highway results in the impairment of or 
damage to the abutting property owner's easements of access, 
light, and air, that damage or impairment are relevant factors 
properly considered in determining severance damages. 
n 
/ 
is 
INSTRUCTION NO, 2 ^ 
If you find that the design and construction of the highway 
project in front of the Carpet Barn property, including the 
placement and size of the curb-cut driveways, the construction 
and location of the retaining wall, unreasonably restricted or 
interfered with the right of access, light and view appurtenant 
to that property, then you must take this into account in 
assessing severance damage even though the design of the highway 
may have been otherwise reasonable from the point of view of 
highway design and construction standards!. 
EXHIBIT F 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lak« County. Utah 
SEP 3 0 1987 
lintitaNCferk 3rd Dtet Court ;°wry Oaputy Ci«rk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE CARPET BARN, a Utah 
c o r p o r a t i o n , KENNETH MACQUEEN 
and HARLA MACQUEEN, 
Plaintiffs 
v s . 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through i t s 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
JOHN NYE and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH X, 
Defendants 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CI\llL NO. C-86-1963 
(See Ins truc t ions No. 1 to No 
INSTRUCTION NO. { % 
"Just compensation," as used in these instructions, is such 
a sum of money as will make the Landowners whole, so that upon 
receipt of the same they will be no poorer and no richer by 
reason of the taking of their property and the related damaged 
than they would be if the same were not taken• Frequently, such 
just compensation is spoken of as damages, and when the word 
"damages" is used in these instructions, you are to keep in mind 
that it has reference to "just compensation" as in these instruc-
tions defined. 
INSTRUCTION NO- I^ 
You are instructed that just compensation is to be paid to 
the landowners for the loss of their property and improvements 
and the damage caused by the construction of the highway project. 
The term "just compensation" is defined as the sum of: (1) the 
fair market value of the property taken by the State, and (2) the 
severance damages accruing to the remaining property not taken 
caused by such taking and the construction of the highway project 
in the manner designed and built. 
Accordingly, the following questions will be answered by you 
in your deliberations in this matter: 
1. As of August 27, 1985, what was the fair market value 
of the property owned by The Carpet Barn, Kenneth MacQueen and 
Harla MacQueen, taken by the State of Utah? 
2. What was the fair market value of the construction 
easement taken by the State for the use of plaintiffs1 land for 
construction purposes? 
3. As of August 27, 1985, what are the severance damages, 
if any, to the remaining property of these landowners resulting 
from the above-described taking and the construction of the 
highway project as designed and built? 
O 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' 
If you should determine plaintiffs are entitled to an award 
of severance damages, the court instructs the jury that the 
following method is to be employed in determining damages to the 
remaining property by reason of its severance from that property 
acquired by the Department of Transportation. You shall consider 
the value of the remaining property before the severance of the 
part acquired and, second, the value of such remaining property 
after severance. If the value of the remaining property after 
the taking is less than the value before the taking, this 
reduction in value is to be considered as severance damage. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \& 
The term "fair market value11 of the property of Kenneth 
MacQueen and Harla MacQueen under consideration herein, both 
BEFORE and AFTER condemnation, is defined as that price which 
such property will bring for sale by one who is informed and 
desires, but is not obligated, to sell and is bought by one who 
is informed and desires, but is not obligated, to purchase the 
same, said property being exposed in the market for a reasonable 
length of time. 
Fair market value, as herein defined, will be det^rniivi *s 
of the 27th day of August, 1985. Those conditions that etc 
normally incident to and effect the sale of property by willing 
and informed private buyers and sellers in the open market are to 
be applied in the measurement of market v^lue, both BEFORE and 
AFTER condemnation by the State. 
J 
INSTRUCTION NO. |0 
In determining the fair market value of the Landowners1 
property both BEFORE and AFTER condemnation by the State, one of 
the primary elements is the consideration of that use to which 
the property would have been placed as of August 27, 1985, and 
within the reasonably foreseeable future in order to obtain the 
greatest return to the Landowners. Such is generally referred to 
as the highest and best use of the property. The highest and 
best use of the Landowners1 property often is, but is not neces-
sarily limited to the actual use being made of the property as of 
the time in question, but rather, it is that use to which a buyer 
and seller would be most apt to place the property at the time in 
question and in the reasonably foreseeable future, having due 
regard for market considerations, the normal business demands and 
wants of the community, and the actual and potential use that 
would have been reasonably known. 
As part of your consideration of the highest and best use in 
this case, you may take into account the actual use being made of 
the subject property in recent years and as of August 27, 1985, 
the location of the property, its zoning in Salt Lake County, 
frontage to and access upon Redwood Road, the upkeep, mainte-
nance, condition and development of axw rnwiPJLa^ properties, and 
all other factors from a fair preponderance of the evidence you 
find that a willing buyer and seller would take into account in 
establishing the highest and best use of the property as of 
August 27, 1985 and in the reasonably foreseeable future. 
EXHIBIT G 
EXHIBIT "6 
